ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF
THE “EURAFRICAN COMMUNITY”

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Abstract

While negotiating for the creation of a European Economic Community (EEC) with five other European countries in 1956 and 1957, France insisted that her overseas territories, mostly on the African Continent, be linked with the Community. Her demand having finally been met, it was decided that the territories under France’s administration, along with those under Belgian, Dutch, and Italian control, be “associated” with the EEC. Thus, when the Community came into being in January 1958, so did a huge “Eurafrica,” connecting the two continents.

This monograph was originally written in March 1965, while I was on a Ford Foundation grant in the United States of America, with a view to discussing the political, economic and moral reasons which lay behind the French attitude in the mid-1950’s. After more than 30 years’ time, the monograph is presented to the public, with additions and modifications to bring it up to date.

Key words : European Economic Community (EEC), Africa, Association, Yaoundé Conventions, Lomé Conventions, PTOM, EAMA, ACP

I

Part IV of the EEC Treaty, signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 by Belgium, France, Federal Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, provided for the association with the EEC of most of the overseas countries and territories (PTOM) of the member states of the Community.

These were, without an exception, dependent territories—most of which were under French control in Africa at that time. Hence, the multilateral relationship between the six European states and their dependencies overseas was, at least until around 1973, termed “Eurafrica.”

It is generally accepted that the creation of Eurafrica was hardly the primary motive in establishing the EEC; it is said : “The association of certain overseas countries and territories [with the EEC] is an important feature of the Treaty but by no means an essential one. The Common Market of the Six could be maintained easily without any association of overseas countries.”
Why, then, did the six European states agree on integrating the overseas territories of France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands into the “European” Common Market? This article is an attempt to discuss as systematically as possible the development of the concept of Eurafrica, in relation to the creation of the EEC, in the late 1950’s and the early 1960’s.

II

Mr. Strauss felt, in connection with the Common Market Treaty negotiations, that: “Probably the most striking, and inevitably the emptiest, of all French triumphs at the conference table was the agreement on the association of colonial territories with the common market.”

It is a well-known fact that France made an association of the overseas territories the sine qua non for joining the EEC project, and that the other European partners, especially Germany, acquiesced reluctantly to the request of the French.

The reason why France, in negotiating the Treaty of Rome with the five other European states, had to stick so stubbornly to her position on the overseas dependencies, as perceived by Mr. Kitzinger, may be summarized as follows:

First, France could not, technically speaking, be simultaneously part of the EEC and of the French franc area that lay largely outside it.

Secondly, France, given the heavy burdens of assisting her African possessions to develop economically, could hardly compete on an equal footing with the rest of industrialized Europe. Moreover, some European countries were beginning to put capital into the more immediately profitable enterprises in Africa, which could only be built up on the basis laid at French public expense.

Thirdly, France felt politically that in Algeria she was fighting on behalf of Europe, and that French investments in Black Africa were also political investments for the free world.

Fourthly, France held as a matter of doctrine that she, with her overseas possessions, formed a cultural and political whole, which no European arrangements should sunder.

Lastly, there was the apparent responsibility incumbent upon France to make the best terms for her overseas possessions.

Why, then, were the Germans hostile to the idea of associating the overseas territories with the European Common Market? M. Drouin gives three essential reasons for it:

(1) The “preferred treatment” given to the products of the associated countries or territories in Africa, in the trade with the Six, hindered the Germans’ relations with their traditionally more important clients and suppliers like Brazil, Ghana, etc. Purchases of coffee and cocoa in these countries allowed the Germans to exchange industrial
products, and a decline of these imports apparently threatened to make their own exports more difficult.

(2) The 200 million dollars that Germany, for her part, had to give over five years to the overseas development fund [FED] appeared above all a gift to France, her former African territories being by far the largest “receiving party.”

(3) At the time when the sensitivity of the African countries and territories was already most acute, this “given association” [association octroyée] appeared dangerous to Germany, in that it could appear as a kind of “neo-colonialism.”

Although both authors present logical arguments based on national interest of France and Germany, other sources also contributed to the idea of Eurafrica, first and foremost the integrationist movements in post-World War II Europe. M. Lefebvre says: “In effect, all the European efforts for cooperation and integration have been doubled in their task of making the European dependencies participate, in a variable measure.”

Mr. Kitzinger writes in the same manner: “Africa played a certain role in [European] federalist thinking from the beginning,” and also that some of the European federalists (particularly French circles) “hoped it [European political unity] would at least buttress the ‘civilizing presence’ of Europe overseas.”

The most important examples of efforts to seek participation of African territories to the European movement, prior to the establishment of the EEC, had been: the Convention of European Economic Cooperation, which gave birth to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), forerunner of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the abortive European Defense Community (EDC), and the Council of Europe with the Plan of Strasbourg. These examples understandably gave encouragement for those who were for a Eurafrican association under the Treaty of Rome.

It is essential to examine carefully the process of the treaty negotiations, conducted by the Six, and the conditions under which they were carried out. It is equally essential to examine the attitude of the French Government and National Assembly, prior to, and during, the treaty negotiations. By doing so, most of the reasons on the founding of the concept of Eurafrica, given by Mr. Kitzinger and M. Drouin, can be accommodated.

In early June, 1955, a conference took place in Messina, Italy, between the ministers of the Six, which discussed the formation of a common market and an atomic pool (Euratom). At this conference, the ministers decided to set up a committee of Government representatives under the chairmanship of M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister. M. Spaak’s Committee had the task of preparing for the conference that would meet to negotiate the necessary treaties. It
submitted a report, commonly known as the “Spaak Report,” to the respective foreign ministers on April 21, 1956, with an invitation to state their views at a ministerial conference in May of the same year in Venice.

It is noteworthy that the Spaak Report had no trace of the conception of associating the overseas territories with the Common Market. It was at the Venice Conference of Foreign Ministers, with M. Spaak as President, on May 29-30, that the problem of association was officially raised, for the first time, by the French Government.

It should be noted that most of the participants of the Venice Conference were not expecting much from it, largely on account of the French attitude, which seemed cool to the proposals contained in the Spaak Report. On May 29, the first day of the conference, however, Mr. Herbert L. Matthews of The New York Times reported from Venice, saying:

The surprise of the day was to find that Foreign Minister Christian Pineau of France spoke positively in favour of both plans [a Common Market and Euratom]...

The French want to include overseas territories in the common market and a special committee was named to study the idea and report at Brussels or later...  

It was not, therefore, without reservations that M. Pineau accepted the Common Market project. But his colleagues from Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, in their overjoy, hardly reflected on the importance of the French proposal of association. Le Monde, in its editorial, went so far as to say:”...For example, the idea of associating Africa and Europe by including the overseas territories in the Common Market appeared to appeal to several of M. Pineau’s colleagues, notably M. Spaak...”

It is obvious that the French Government began to ask officially for inclusion of the overseas territories in the EEC only at the Venice Conference of May, 1956. There is no means of knowing exactly when the change took place in the attitude of the French Government, except that it was during the year between the Messina and the Venice Conferences.

Ever since the Venice meeting, Paris incessantly insisted, animo et facto, on the inclusion into the European Common Market of the overseas possessions. The French demand constituted the greatest stumbling block in the ensuing negotiations.

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It would be expedient to dwell at this point upon the attitude of the prospective members of the EEC other than France and Germany, the two giant powers at the conference table.

Needless to say, France could not ask her partners to include into the EEC only her own overseas territories. She stipulated that the territories administered by Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands be also put under Community responsibility. It is said: “To gild the pill, the whole operation was multilateralized both ways including the Belgian and Italian colonies in Africa (Congo, Somalia) and Holland’s territory in Asia (New Guinea).”

Particularly interesting was the attitude of the Belgian Government. It was stated that France, who proposed association of the overseas territories with the EEC at Venice, “tried, immediately
after the Conference, to formulate a common policy with Belgium.”

On December 20, 1956, Premier Guy Mollet of France, at a luncheon of the Association des journalistes d’outre-mer, while contending that the inclusion of the French colonies in the European Common Market would be a beneficial move for it, said: “We are happy in this regard to be aided by our Belgian friends who have adopted an attitude very much like ours.”

When the French National Assembly took up for discussion the draft treaty establishing the EEC, in January, 1957, M. Maurice Faure, Foreign Secretary of State, made a statement in which he endorsed Premier Mollet. He said:

Since the Venice Conference, the French Government has made it clear unequivocably for the association of the overseas territories with the Common Market and wished that its partners, notably Belgium, adopt the same attitude. The ensuing negotiations have permitted an adjustment of the viewpoints of the two countries.

There are, however, indications that the Belgians aligned themselves with the French only at the very last stage of the treaty negotiations. A report of Mr. Robert C. Doty of The New York Times, on February 16, 1957, from Paris, indicates that Belgium—as all the other four states—still had reservations about the French plan.

Belgium was presumably hesitant in accepting the French proposal and associating her own territories in Africa with the EEC, principally because of their peculiar status. The traditional Open Door in the commercial field in the Congo was an international obligation, and Ruanda-Urundi was, like Italian Somalia, a United Nations trust territory where trade discrimination among the Organization’s member states was prohibited (Article 76 (d) of the United Nations Charter).

The Netherlands was against the French idea of association for the larger part of the treaty negotiations. “In the Dutch view, a good example of the multilateral approach would be a programme covering the whole of Europe on the one side and all of Africa on the other.”

The Dutch, therefore, were not willing to accept the French plan of associating part of Africa with the EEC, an organization made up of “Little Europe.” There were doubts and apprehensions about the French demand in The Hague, and even when the Dutch finally yielded to it, they did not press for an immediate association of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles with the Community.

Italy, with a single overseas territory, Somalia—which was due to obtain independence in 1960—was equally opposed to the French idea of association. It seems, however, that while opposing basically this idea, she wanted Libya, as well as Somalia, to be taken into consideration, if the French colonies would ever be aided financially by the EEC. When the French scheme was finally accepted by the premiers of the Six, The New York Times carried a report, dated February 21, 1957, from Rome:
...Even among those who supported the moves there were some misgivings about the common market pact provision to aid in the development of overseas territories. Some thought this might result in too heavy a drain on Italy’s finances. Others were afraid that Italy might become involved in France’s colonial squabbles.

Others feared that Italian agriculture would suffer from the competition of the French colonies.\textsuperscript{21}

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As had been scheduled at the Venice Conference, the foreign ministers of the Six, with M. Spaak as President, gathered in Brussels on June 26, 1956. Before they remet in early 1957, again under M. Spaak’s chairmanship, experts of the Six often held meetings at the Château de Val-Duchesse, close to the capital of Belgium.

Little is known about the Brussels Conference of June, 1956.\textsuperscript{22} With regard to the meetings at Val-Duchesse—organized in all likelihood along the principles decided at Brussels—, emphasis was apparently laid on the technical side of the problems. Although the experts apparently produced valuable results, regarding \textit{inter alia} the overseas problem,\textsuperscript{23} much to the praise of M. Spaak,\textsuperscript{24} it seems that the Conference of Foreign Ministers, met at the same château on January 26-28 and February 4, 1957, was involved more in political considerations. The results of this approach apparently had the effect of negating the technical conclusions previously arrived at. Thus, the foreign ministers eventually could not come to an agreement on the French proposal of association, and decided to meet again in Paris on February 18. It was further agreed that the heads of government of the Six would meet there, too, as originally proposed by Premier Mollet of France,\textsuperscript{25} to settle once and for all the knotty overseas problem.

Negotiations between the foreign ministers of the Six took place in Paris on February 18, 1957. Then the premiers, as well as the foreign ministers, met on February 19 and 20. The problem of inclusion of the overseas possessions into the Common Market was now the principal remaining hurdle.

At a meeting of experts on February 16 and 17, preparatory to the Foreign Ministers’ Conference, the five European states were yet far from relishing the French idea. It is known that France had sought from her European partners annual contributions from $100,000,000 to $150,000,000 to be used with still larger French contributions for the economic development of the overseas territories, and that, in return, she had offered to open up gradually her possessions to the export of her partners. “In a memorandum to the five other national delegations,” wrote Mr. Harold Callender of \textit{The New York Times} on February 17, “the French said their ultimate objective was to bring all the overseas territories completely into the common market. But they proposed to begin by an experimental five-year period during which those territories would receive European exports on a limited but annually increasing scale...”\textsuperscript{26}

“Meanwhile,” continued Mr. Callender, “the French would expect the five nations to buy increasing quantities of farm products and raw materials from the overseas areas. The French proposed these products should benefit from preferential tariffs in the common market....

“Although the French maintain that Algeria is constitutionally a part of Metropolitan France,
they rank it as an overseas territory in these negotiations...”

To this high-handed attitude of France’s, the experts of the other countries offered resistance. According to Mr. Callender:

....The West Germans had been reported to be resisting this [French] proposal, but they were said tonight [February 17] to have made a similar proposal of their own that the Dutch supported.

This proposal was reported to prove that a small part of the annual investments by the five nations should cover public works and another part unremunerative economic developments relying on public funds. Private capital was expected to move into the territories for industrial and other remunerative investments.

At the meeting of the foreign ministers on February 18, the Belgians finally aligned themselves with the French. On the same day, Mr. Callender reported:

....The Ministers labored until nearly midnight, then referred the problem [of associating the overseas territories with the EEC] for final judgment tomorrow to the heads of governments of the six nations....

The French found themselves almost isolated, except for Belgian support, in seeking to bring the overseas territories into the common market....

Finally, on February 19 and 20, the premiers and the foreign ministers of the Six met. On February 19, agreement on the French proposal of association appeared to be a remote possibility. On that day, Mr. Callender sent from Paris the following dispatch:

Six European Premiers spent about eight hours in a vain effort to reach agreement on the main lines of a treaty to create a common market, or customs union, embracing their countries and overseas territories....

There was strong French and Belgian pressure today on the West German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, to wind up the common market negotiations by the compromise on the colonial question. The Chancellor was susceptible to these pleas, since he is an ardent backer of European union and will face elections in September....

Dr. Adenauer’s own officials resisted the French plan to include the colonies in the market in order to get European capital for colonial development. They proposed to grant the capital through a fund amounting to $500,000,000 in five years, while leaving the colonies out of the market.

One apparent purpose to assembling the six premiers—somewhat prematurely, it appeared today—was to bring Dr. Adenauer to Paris and persuade him to overrule his own officials.... The hope in French and Belgian circles tonight was that this persuasion would succeed tomorrow....
“The hope in French and Belgian circles” was indeed realized on the following day of February 20; the premiers did agree to include the overseas territories within the Common Market, and issued a communiqué to that effect.

Algeria, together with the other French Overseas Departments, was accorded a twofold status, being, on the one hand, close to full membership in the Community (Article 227 of the Rome Treaty), and, on the other hand, treated in a similar way with the associated territories (Article 16 of the Implementing Convention). It is understood that the French proposal to grant Algeria this peculiar status had contributed to accentuate the reserves of the other European countries. Italy, for example, was particularly mindful about the “possibility offered to the Algerian manpower and agricultural products.”

Judging from the way in which the question of association was treated in various conferences and meetings, it is clear that it was only “after a hard fight,” as Mr. Callender puts it, that the French fully realized their intention of including the overseas territories, mostly theirs, into the Common Market.

Dr. Adenauer of Germany played, there is no doubt, a role of capital importance in bringing the French intention into realization. It should be remembered that Dr. Adenauer not only had to persuade “his own officials” in Paris, on February 19 and 20, into accepting the idea of association, but also, as he himself recalled in later years, the Socialists and the Liberals in Germany who hardly supported the idea. It is known that Dr. Adenauer was eager to advance the integration of Europe, and was convinced it fell under Germany’s obligations to do so. “Since 1945,” Mr. Alexander maintains, “no one has had a clearer perception of these German obligations toward Europe, and no one has tried more sincerely to meet them than Konrad Adenauer.” His concessions to France indeed made it possible to clear up the outstanding point at issue at the treaty negotiations in Paris.

IV

How did “national interest” grow in the political and commercial circles of France, with regard to inclusion into the Common Market scheme of her territories in Africa and elsewhere? Turning now to this point, it should be noted that in the interval between the Messina Conference (June, 1955) and the presentation of the Spaak Report (April, 1956) the French held elections, and in late January, 1956, M. Mollet replaced Premier Edgar Faure. M. Mollet, strongly “European,” as Mr. Strauss describes him, was “generally regarded as the pilot best suited to get the Euratom and Common Market treaties through the French Assembly.”

It may be said that M. Mollet’s Government had, by the end of 1956, taken a very firm attitude with regard to the necessity of including the overseas territories into the Common Market. Premier Mollet, on December 20, 1956, on the occasion of the already-mentioned luncheon of the Association des journalistes d’outre-mer, made the following remark:
I have no intention of penalizing France in the problem of integrating France and the overseas territories in the European [Common] Market. France can only enter the Common Market with her overseas territories; otherwise there will not be any common market....

Why, then, did the French Government harden its attitude a short time before the treaty negotiations started in Paris in February, 1957? Part of the answer should be sought in the situation in Algeria in those days. By the time the Venice Conference was met in May, 1956, the troubles in North Africa, especially in Algeria, had already become the main preoccupation of Paris. During the first months of 1957, the frequency and ferocity of acts of terror in some cities of Algeria reached a new high. The situation in Algeria occupied the attention of the Afro-Asian members of the United Nations, and upon their request the Algerian question was placed on the General Assembly's agenda in February, 1957.

Previous to this, Premier Mollet made public a “declaration of intention on Algeria” on January 9. In this important declaration, he said:

Algeria [is the] foundation of the large Franco-African whole [ensemble franco-africain] of a new type, based on a community of cultural, economic, strategic, and political interests, which is in preparation...

The Franco-African whole will not be closed. It is the French desire that countries like Tunisia and Morocco be freely associated to it in order to benefit from the advantages of the common enterprise, and notably from what the Sahara can offer.

More than a Franco-African whole, it is a Euro-African whole [ensemble eurafricain] which we must talk about. France is now negotiating with her European partners the formation of a large common market, to which the overseas territories will be associated. It is Europe in its entirety which will be called to aid in the development of Africa, and it is Eurafrica which can become tomorrow one of the essential factors in world politics.

M. Mollet, later in the same month of January, 1957, seized an opportunity to express in public his conviction along the same line. French Foreign Minister Pineau followed the lead of Premier Mollet in a debate on the Algerian question in the Political Committee of the U. N. General Assembly of February 4.

The French expected, therefore, to find a solution to the Algerian problem by erecting first a “large Franco-African whole,” and then an even larger “Euro-African whole.” Mr. Kitzinger says: “The association of French Africa south of the Sahara with the Common Market made the position of Algeria within it quite natural and obscured any immediate issues about German, Dutch or Italian attitudes on the future of the Algerian Departments.”

Association with the EEC of its territories in Black Africa was a political “must” for the French Government at that time. It probably thought also that, by integrating into the Community these
African possessions, it might erase any possibility of them turning into another Algeria. Mr. Callender of The New York Times reported on February 18, 1957, in connection with the Paris meeting of the foreign ministers of the Six, working on the problem of association, that:

The French placed the whole argument on a political rather than an economic basis. They contended the colonies must be kept European and hinted that otherwise they might become Communist. Implicit in this argument was the suggestion that France alone could not finance keeping them European.  

The obstinacy of the French Government with regard to the overseas problem received the general support of the French National Assembly in a debate on foreign affairs on December 21, 1956. In accordance with the proposal of the Government to examine the Common Market and Euratom treaties prior to their signature, the Assembly had a heated discussion on these treaties, particularly on the overseas problem, from 15 to 22 January, 1957. Many of the MP’s, including those from Madagascar and the French overseas territories in Africa, supported the Government’s policy of associating these territories with the EEC. On the close of the debate, on January 22, Premier Mollet declared his Government’s stand as follows:

France will enter the Common Market with her overseas territories... Their association must be established on the three following principles: each country of the Community will progressively obtain an equal access to the overseas products; each of them will participate in financing the public investments overseas; each of them will give a system of preferential treatment to the agricultural products for the overseas territories.

The Government considers that the association of the overseas territories must be regulated on the above-mentioned principles before the treaty is signed. I asked M. Houphouet-Boigny to join our delegation at Brussels, and he made on this subject a presentation which created a very strong impression...

It should be added here that on the side of the overseas territories, in particular the French ones, there was a feeling very similar to that of the French Government. For example, M. Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, to whose participation in the treaty negotiations M. Mollet referred at the National Assembly, expressed in 1957 such a pro-French feeling.

How did France’s commercial and industrial circles regard the situation?

Ever since the end of World War II, war-devastated France had sought the cooperation of other European countries in order to develop her vast possessions in Africa. One of the earliest indications of France’s interest in inducing such European countries as the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Switzerland—but not West Germany—to cooperate with her in Africa is found in a 1948 issue of L’Afrique et l’Asie. M. René Mayer, in March, 1953, referred to the desirability of
American capital being invested in the French territories.48

Paris and Bonn both signed, in April, 1951, a treaty establishing the ECSC, and now the possibility that West Germany’s steel industry might be allowed to share in the exploitation of French North Africa was regarded as a valuable concession by France.49

It is in this way that commercial and industrial interests in France were awakened to the necessity of having as much foreign investment as possible directed to the Sahara region and also to Black Africa.50 This desire of France’s found natural expression in the course of the negotiation of the European Common Market scheme. Indeed, France “felt that she could not grant economic concessions to her European partners and, at the same time, maintain a costly development program for her overseas territories. She therefore felt Community assistance was needed.” 51

But Germany, for her part, even after the establishment of the EEC, “apparently sees little reason why the Community should do what the countries themselves can do just as well, if not better.” 52

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To understand why France initially proposed—or had to propose— inclusion of her overseas territories in the EEC project, attention should now be directed to the existence of the French franc zone.

V

The very first of the reasons which Mr. Kitzinger raised in explanation of France’s position with regard to her overseas territories is, as we have seen, a technical one. Speaking of the incompatibility of a European customs union and of a French franc area that lay largely outside it, he asks: “How, in such a situation, could one prevent other European countries re-exporting their manufactures across France to the overseas countries at the preferential rate of duty, and how could one prevent overseas produce travelling duty-free through France to the rest of the Community?” 53

As a matter of fact, when France first took part, with five other European nations, in the discussion of the possibility of creating a general common market, one of the first concerns in Paris must have been the fate of the overseas territories which had long formed part of the franc zone. For France, rupture of her advantageous economic relations with the rest of the franc area was simply unimaginable. According to M. Drouin, she could not, from a moral viewpoint, deny her overseas territories the advantages of the Common Market.54 If “divorce” from these territories was a priori put out of the question, then “bigamy,” with all ensuing difficulties, was the only solution for France to take. Overall extension of the Rome Treaty to the overseas territories was, however, considered unrealistic;55 “association” was a necessary compromise solution.56 Indeed, France felt she had to seek such an arrangement if she was to enter the EEC.

Some people say that France could overcome the difficulties, at least in the short run, and succeed in sustaining the franc area arrangements while she was part of the EEC. “The marketing arrangements operated by France... are not directly affected by the new tariff regime established
under the Rome Treaty. Nor does the Treaty otherwise oblige France to do away with these schemes. This is undoubtedly one of the most obscure points of the Treaty.  

Not only commodity trade between France and her colonies overseas but invisible trade between them seemed unaffected by the establishment of the EEC. For example, it is said, with reference to the “monopoly of the flag”—the system practiced between France and some of her overseas territories whereby all overseas imports and exports were carried in French ships—that “the Rome Treaty makes no reference to any dismantling of this system.”

It is rightly pointed out, however, in connection with the franc area marketing arrangements, that “arrangements of this type may, moreover, be difficult to retain in a fully established common market, particularly where they are made possible by high consumer prices.” It may be said with safety that the franc area began the process of disintegration, in consequence of the customs and quota disarmament measures of the EEC.

VI

After an analysis of various conceivable reasons which led the French Government to press for an association with the European Common Market of the overseas territories, one is left with the following impression: France could have joined the EEC without her colonies being associated with it; but, for technical, economic, and moral reasons, she decided, after a careful examination of the Spaak Report, submitted in April, 1956, to ask her European partners for the inclusion of the overseas territories.

France knew that, in the treaty negotiations, she was in a strong bargaining position. Her partners were very anxious to form a European customs union with France as a full-fledged member. Obviously, an association with the Common Market of the overseas possessions meant certain political and economic difficulties, at least in the short run, for the countries other than France. But France saw that the other participants to the negotiations were ready to concede almost any of her demands, and stuck obstinately to her idea of association. In addition, the Algerian crisis made M. Mollet’s Government convinced that association of the overseas territories and a special status for Algeria within the Community was a matter of great political urgency.

The five other European states, which were reluctant in accepting the French proposal largely on political grounds, had to concede largely on political grounds again. And, after all, these countries did not only see the dark side of association; they knew, probably as much as France, that it had its long-term economic, as well as political, advantages to offer them.

Once it was decided that the overseas territories would be associated with the EEC, the five European states joined France to rationalize, and even ennoble, the new situation by having recourse to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and by appealing to the lofty vision of the Eurafrican Community. The Commission and the Assembly (to be known later as the European Parliament) of the EEC have followed suit. For example, the First General Report of the Commission explains in the following terms why the overseas territories were associated with the
Common Market:

The six signatory Governments recognized during the Treaty negotiations that those Member States which carry special responsibilities towards non-European countries and territories would be ignoring their responsibilities if these countries and territories were deprived of the chances of increased prosperity and well-being offered by the establishment of the Community....

The Member States have thus shown that they are aware of the duty of solidarity with less advanced countries in process of development, a duty now accepted by the highly industrialized nations. The Community could not but accept a major role in this universal task of economic and technical advancement and of financial assistance....

Before the “experimental five-year period” of association, to borrow Mr. Callender’s expression, was over in 1962, many territories in Africa, including Algeria, had gained independence (See map of Africa in 1962 attached hereto), which inevitably necessitated a transformation of the nature of the relationship between the EEC and the newly-born African states and Madagascar. The first Convention of Association was signed in Yaoundé on July 29, 1963, effective from 1964 to 1969, between the six EEC members and 18 African states, now termed as “EAMA.”

The first Yaoundé Convention was replaced by the second between the Six and 18—later 19—EAMA (effective 1971-1975).

Admission into the EEC of three new members, especially the United Kingdom, in January 1973, was followed by yet another transformation of the concept of Eurafrique, as the countries, formerly British, in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), had to be brought into a relationship of one kind or another with the enlarged Community. Frey-Wouters states that France, supported by Belgium and Italy, preferred the Yaoundé formula and that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Federal Germany supported a more open type of cooperation agreement. But David Spanier and Patrick Brogan, correspondents of The Times, wrote from Paris where the first European Council was held on October 19 and 20, 1972: “In a conciliatory gesture to France, Mr. Heath [the British Prime Minister] accepted that the Community should give priority to the (mainly French-speaking) associated countries in Africa and those Commonwealth countries (African and Caribbean[sic]) which apply for similar treatment.”

On February 28, 1975, the first Lomé Convention was signed between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and 46 developing countries (ACP) on the other (effective until February 1980). When the convention went under way, the Ninth General Report declared that the Convention was “intended to be a ‘new model for relations between developed and developing States,’” while The Economist said, somewhat extravagantly: “Grandiose white elephants are out.”
18 States (16 of which proclaimed independence in 1960; Ruanda-Urundi became independent in July 1962 as two separate states: Rwanda and Burundi) and two territories (Comoros and Somaliland) that were associated with the EEC in July, 1963.

( ) Dependencies as in 1962, including self-governing territories.

1 Morocco
2 Algeria
3 Tunisia
4 Libya
5 The United Arab Republic (Egypt since 1971)

(6) Ifni (Sp.); ceded to Morocco in 1969
(7) Sahara (Sp.); generally known as Western Sahara since the Spaniards departed in 1975. Now claimed by Morocco and by the Polisario Front

8 The Sudan
9 Mauritania
10 Mali
11 Niger
12 Chad

(13) The Gambia (Br.); independent since 1965
(14) Guinea (Port.); independent as Guinea-Bissau since 1974

15 Senegal
16 Guinea
17 Sierra Leone
18 Liberia

19 The Ivory Coast
20 Upper Volta (Burkina Faso since 1984)

21 Ghana
22 Togo
23 Dahomey (Benin since 1975)
24 Nigeria

25 Cameroon
26 The Central African Republic

(27) Guinea (Sp.); independent as Equatorial Guinea since 1968
(28) São Tomé and Príncipe (Port.); independent since 1975

29 Gabon
30 The Congo (ex-French)

(31) Somaliland (Fr.; Côte des Somalis); name of the territory was later changed to Afars et Issas; independent as Djibouti since 1977
32 Ethiopia

(33) Kenya (Br.); independent since 1963

34 Uganda
35 Rwanda
36 Burundi
37 Tanganyika; union in 1964 with Zanzibar to become Tanzania

(38) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Br.); Nyasaland independent as Malawi since 1964; Northern Rhodesia independent as Zambia since 1964 and Southern Rhodesia independent as Zimbabwe since 1980

(39) Bechuanaland (Br.); independent as Botswana since 1966
(40) Angola (Port.); independent since 1975
(41) South-West Africa (South African); independent as Namibia since 1990
(42) Basutoland (Br.); independent as Lesotho since 1966
(43) Swaziland (Br.); independent since 1968
(44) Mozambique (Port.); independent since 1975

45 The Republic of South Africa
46 Madagascar

(47) The Comoros (Fr.); an archipelago of four islands, three of which gained independence in 1975 as the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros. The fourth island, Mahoré (Mayotte), remains a French overseas territory

48 The Congo (ex-Belgian)
49 Somalia

(50) Zanzibar (Br.); union in 1964 with Tanganyika
(51) Réunion (Fr.)
The first Lomé Convention was replaced by the second (1980-1985) and the third (1986-1990), and now the fourth, valid for ten years, has been in effect since September 1991 between 12—later 15—European states of the EEC—now integrated into the European Union (EU)—and 69—later 71—ACP countries. As far as Africa is concerned, it can safely be said that practically all of the continent is now part of the Lomé Convention—a tardy realization of the claim made by The Hague in 1957.

Negotiations for a new development partnership agreement to replace Lomé after the year 2000 were launched in Brussels on September 30, 1998. It is presumably too early, at this moment, to predict what shape the relationship between Europe, on the threshold of expansion toward several countries of the former Soviet bloc, and the developing world will take in the 21st century.

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They no longer speak of “Eurafrica” or “the Eurafican Community”; but inclusion into the EEC of the overseas territories of the member states in 1958 will long be remembered as an example of how one nation’s political interest can impose upon an internationally conceived plan, broaden its scope, and transform its nature.

REFERENCES


5. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, who advocated the formation of Pan-Europe after World War I, also had Africa in mind, but took a view which lay more emphasis on Europe’s interest than on Africa’s. See Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 178-181.


8. Ibid., p. 5.

9. For details, see Lefebvre, Afrique..., pp. 27-43.


20. A declaration of intention, in which the Member States of the EEC showed their readiness to open negotiations on the association of these Dutch territories with the Community, was annexed to the Rome Treaty. This process was adopted, however, partly because of the self-governing status of these territories. See “Association with Surinam,” *Common Market*, I, No. 13 (November, 1961), p. 197.


23. Apparently, an article in *Le Monde*, June 28, 1956, p. 4, is the only reference to this conference.


27. The introduction of association on a five-year basis might be said to represent a French concession at this stage of negotiations. As a matter of fact, the main body of the conditions of association was incorporated in the five-year


29. Ibid.


55. In the case of Euratom, the overseas territories could find their way to integration with it (Article 198 (1) of the Euratom Treaty).


61. The six European states declare, in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, not only their intention “to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas countries,” but also their desire “to ensure the development of their prosperity in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

62. Premier Mollet of France, immediately after the treaty negotiations of February, 1957, visited the capitals of the United States and Canada, and said to President Eisenhower that the decision of the Six to associate the African territories with the EEC “exemplified Europe’s desire to place its industrial potential at the service of Africa and to reinforce the interdependence of the two continents” (*The Times* [London], March 1, 1957, p. 8). At a joint session of Canadian parliament, he said: “The Eurafican group would be a vast union of free people, efficiently independent to their mutual profit and their common prosperity” (*The Times* [London], March 5, 1957, p. 7). See also Adenauer, *Erinnerungen...*, p. 269.


