

The Policy of Apartheid and the Japanese in the Republic of South Africa (2)

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The year 1991 will become known in history as the year in which South Africa finally removed statutory discrimination from its system.

[The repeal by Parliament of the Population Registration Act] finally brought to an end an era in which the lives of every South African were affected in the minutest detail by racially based legislation. Now, everybody is free from it.

*And everybody is liberated from the moral dilemma caused by this legislation which was born and nurtured under different circumstances in a departed era.**

INTRODUCTION

When I was writing Part One of this monograph in 1964, the Union of South Africa had already ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and had become a republic. I believe that the policy of apartheid in those days had had to face sporadic criticism from countries like India in the United Nations and elsewhere, but it had not become the focus of world-wide censure and denunciation, nor had the resentment and the rage of the non-White inhabitants within the country reached the scales of later years, though the world had witnessed upheavals in South Africa like the one in Sharpsville in March 1960. It was on 12 November 1973 that the Republic of South Africa was barred from the United Nations General Assembly and its committees, and it was in June 1976 that a bloody uprising swept through Soweto and other black townships surrounding Johannesburg, which spelled a decisive turning point in the history of protest against the racist rule of South Africa.

Since 1964, I kept watching the ensuing developments in and around South Africa, which eventually led to the abolition of her policy of apartheid, and endeavoured to collect information relating to my subject. I would like to publish some of it in the following pages in the hope that it is of use and interest to the readers of Part One of this monograph.

* President F. W. de Klerk on 17 June 1991, addressing a special joint sitting of the three Houses of Parliament.

Key words: Union (Republic) of South Africa, apartheid, Japanese, United Nations

1. THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE WW II

There is no means of knowing when the first Japanese came to settle in what is now the Republic of South Africa, but one can easily assume that the Japanese were relative late comers to that part of Africa. I learned through a book written by Naokichi Nakamura, an explorer, with the help of writer Shunro Oshikawa (1876-1914), that there were about twenty Japanese in Cape Town, including three women, when Mr. Nakamura reached there in May 1903. According to his book, one of the Japanese residents, by the name of Komabei Furutani, had been running a successful general store there since 1887. Mr. Nakamura also recorded that there were three Japanese in Johannesburg whom “people always took for Chinese,” and that two Japanese, Iwasaki and Ogawa, were keeping a general store-cum-laundry in Durban ¹⁾.

It is common knowledge that racial segregation and discrimination in the Union of South Africa were perpetuated, first, through custom and practice, and later, through such laws as the Mines and Works Act (1911), the Natives Land Act (1913), the Immigrants' Regulation Act (1913), the Native (Urban Areas) Act (1923), the Representation of Natives Act (1936), the South African Citizenship Act (1944), etc. When the Immigrants' Regulation Act took effect on 1 August 1913, the Japanese in the Union were declared on that very day “prohibited immigrants” along with other Asiatics. The Government of Japan had appointed Mr. Julius Jeppe in April 1910 as Honorary Consul of Japan in Cape Town, and, upon instructions from Tokyo, he tried unsuccessfully to see that the Japanese be waived from the application of the Act.

Mr. Jeppe was replaced by Mr. Yaoichi Shimizu, Vice-Consul, when he opened a consulate in Cape Town in August 1918. (He was promoted to the rank of Consul in December 1919.) Mr. Shimizu and his successor, Mr. Tadanao Imai, who took office in September 1920, resumed negotiations with the South African authorities focusing on the extent to which the Immigrants' Regulation Act should apply to the Japanese. It was Vice-Consul Soju Yamaguchi, arriving in Cape Town in June 1927 as Acting Consul in that city, who succeeded, on 15 October 1930, to exchange official letters with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of South Africa, an exchange of letters which constituted a kind of “gentlemen's agreement” which resulted in the Japanese in South Africa being exempted from the application of the Act.

It must be borne in mind, however, that even before October 1930 the Japanese were occasionally waived from the Act. For instance, the Minister of Agriculture of the Union decided, on 2 September 1930, to permit Japanese wool dealers to enter the Union ²⁾.

It is true that the importance of Japan (including Korea and Formosa) in South Africa's external trade since WW I increased, in particular as a source of import, as is evident from the statistics of the League of Nations ³⁾. Moreover, the Osaka Shosen Company had opened a regular line in 1926, connecting Japan and South Africa by sea.

In my view, however, an interview which Mr. Yagi, a Japanese reporter, had by chance aboard

a train bound from Cape Town to Kimberley with Mr. A. P. J. Fourie, Minister of Mines and Industries of the Union, in October 1929, should have influenced, not in a small measure, the attitude of the Government of South Africa. According to Mr. Yagi, the Minister of Mines and Industries had no knowledge, to the former's surprise, that the Japanese in the Union were "prohibited immigrants," and, upon learning of this, declared that he would consult the other members of the cabinet "to rectify the situation."⁴⁾

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Shigetaka Shiga (1863-1927), a renowned geographer in the Meiji and Taisho eras of Japan, paid two visits to South Africa in 1910 and 1922, and often makes reference to them in *The Complete Works of Shigetaka Shiga* (8 vols, 1927-1929; reprinted by Tokyo : Nihon Tosho Centre, 1995).

Dr. Shiga's first visit took place when South Africa was coming into existence through the union of the two British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal and the two former Afrikaaner republics of Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal). Shiga stated in a book published in 1912 that the Malays and Indians in Cape Town were making much fuss about the refusal to them of the right to vote for the Union Parliament and that they even had tried to talk the only one Japanese family in that town into joining their movement, in which the latter showed no interest (III, 221-222).

Shiga seemed to believe that South Africa would be a good market for Japan, as, he says : (i) South Africa was a country expected to develop in the future, (ii) being a mining and farming country, it had no manufacturing industry worthy of note, and that (iii) consumer purchasing power in that country was high, especially in the Cape Colony. (According to Shiga, the per capita income in any of South Africa's four provinces was higher than that of Japan at that time.) (III, 222-223)

In the same book of his, Shiga said that before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, vessels serving Japan and Europe had to call at Cape Town, which would explain why there were so many objects of ancient Japanese art in museums, in Cecil Rhode's residence, etc., in the town. From Dutch boats wrecked off the Cape of Good Hope, many Japanese ceramics had been salvaged (III, 224-226). Takeaki Enomoto (1836-1908), who had gone to the Netherlands to study in 1862, went to his destination via Cape Town and returned to Japan in 1867 aboard the Kaiyomaru, constructed in that European country, again via Cape Town (III, 227).

Shiga said also that Captain Hachiro Hiraoka joined the British army in 1899 to fight against Transvaal and Natal, and that the first boats bound for Brazil with Japanese emigrants (the first such boat, the Kasadomaru, in 1906, included) called at Cape Town (III, 227).

When Shiga went to South Africa again in 1922, the Immigrants' Regulation Act (1913) had been enforced and WW I had been waged. In an article in October 1924, he gave

three reasons why he had gone there for a second time : (i) South Africa was the source of the “river of racial discrimination,” the river flowed through Australia and emptied itself in the United States; (ii) South Africa had become a centre of international diplomacy, the British Empire had now been virtually divided into five units, i. e., the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; and (3) South Africa was now a new outlet of Japanese goods (III, 373-374).

In his opinion, racial discrimination in the white-dominated world was preventing the Japanese nation from growing further, and the source of discrimination, South Africa, had to be thoroughly studied (I, 373-374); to achieve his purpose, he even met General Jan Christiaan Smuts, the Prime Minister of the Union, in Pretoria, and told him how illogical racial prejudice could be, and to expound himself, he promised Prime Minister Smutz to write a letter en route to Brazil, which he did (IV, 424-433). Dr. Shiga told the Prime Minister that Japan had fought against Germany on the side of the British Empire during WW I, defending the interests of the Allied Powers, and that, because of the Immigrants’ Regulation Act, the Japanese both residing in and coming to South Africa were having unpleasant experiences. (He enumerated such experiences encountered by himself and by his Japanese friends.) He said in the letter that there were only four Japanese merchants in South Africa (three in Cape Town and one in Ceres) who had come there before the taking effect of the Act.

On the other hand, Shiga said in his 1924 article that after WW I trade had very remarkably increased between Japan and South Africa. (Japan’s exports to South Africa by more than 50 times, the former’s imports, such as wool and wattle, from the latter by 400 times!) (IV, 419-422) ⁹⁾.

2. OFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOUTH AFRICA

Before WW II, Japan had a legation in the Union of South Africa and a consulate in Cape Town.

As stated in Chapter One of this monograph, the Japanese Government appointed an honorary consul in Cape Town in April 1910 in the person of a South African, and after his departure, professional consular officers from August 1918 onward.

The Japanese legation was installed in Pretoria on 25 October 1937, that is , decades after the establishment of consular relations with the Union of South Africa. The Union was represented in Japan by the Embassy of His Britanic Majesty.

Both the Japanese Consulate in Cape Town and the Legation of Japan in Pretoria were closed, however, on 12 February and 14 October 1940 respectively, as WW II had broken out in Europe.

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The Peace Treaty, concluded in San Francisco on 8 September 1951 between Japan and 44 countries, including the Union of South Africa, took effect on 28 April 1952, and a Consulate-

General of Japan was opened in Pretoria on 24 November 1952. South Africa, now a republic, opened its consular representation in Tokyo in April 1963.

When the Republic of South Africa had abandoned its policy of apartheid, official relations between the two countries were normalized. On 1 February 1992, an Embassy of Japan was established in Pretoria, and on 8 March, Mr. Masatoshi Ohta, who first arrived in Pretoria as Consul-General and then, from 1 February to 7 March, 1992, was head of the Embassy of Japan in the capacity of Chargé d'Affaires a. i., was accredited as the first Ambassador of Japan in the Republic of South Africa ⁶⁾.

The Republic, on its part, elevated its Consulate-General in Tokyo to the rank of an Embassy in 1992. Mr. Alexander Waldemar Kuhn, who had taken his appointment as Consul-General in Tokyo on 6 June 1988, was accredited to the Emperor of Japan on 30 March 1992 as the Republic's first Ambassador to Japan.

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A Japanese language school was opened on 31 August 1966 in Johannesburg, the largest Japanese community in South Africa, and it developed into a school covering nine years of compulsory education in April 1967. The school is run by the Japanese Society in South Africa, of which the bulk of members reside in Johannesburg, with a subsidy from the Government of Japan. It is registered as a private educational institution in accordance with South African law.

As of May 1998, there were 54 pupils in the six-year primary course and 13 in the three-year junior middle course, with 12 teachers from Japan and two locally recruited ones ⁷⁾.

3. INTRODUCTION TO JAPAN OF THE TERM "HONORARY WHITES"

It was when Dr. Daniel F. Malan's National Party came to power in 1942 that the policy of apartheid was established with vigour, and this policy was reinforced or reformed by succeeding National Party leaders.

However, the fact that the Japanese, travelling or residing in South Africa, were treated, *de jure* or *de facto*, as Europeans was scarcely recognized in Japan until the mid-1960's. To the best of my knowledge, and within the confines of first-class newspapers in Japan, there was an article written by Mr. Arima, a former correspondent of *The Asahi Shimbun*, which, probably for the first time, brought to the attention of the Japanese public the situation prevailing in South Africa in the first half of 1966. Mr. Arima wrote:

... On this [African] continent, distant from Japan, I saw many Japanese go through hardships of various kinds. In West African countries like Ghana and Nigeria, nature is far from propitious, and they cannot go without an anti-malarial every morning. But even in countries like Kenya and South Africa where a congenial climate prevails, they are confronted with problems of a peculiar kind, i. e., social ones, stemming from antipathy against the

lopsided trade relations between Japan and East Africa, racial situations in which they are involved, etc. These, I think, are inseparable from the way Japan's policy toward Africa is to be shaped.

At the end of last year [1965], when Japan gained a seat on the U. N. Security Council, Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina said his nation would be obliged to scrap its "policy of a double standard," even if it would inflict losses in its trade with South Africa. This statement aroused, I was told, considerable unrest amongst Japanese bank and trade representatives in that country...

They harboured suspicions as to whether their government would be "sacrificing" an important trade market they had exploited in South Africa. They asked themselves if, in return, their government would try to ease the ever-existent one-sided trade situation between Black Africa and Japan.

If you were to go to Africa yourself, you could see that their misgivings are not without grounds. Those Japanese in the Republic of South Africa are fighting hard for their country under the watchword of "establishment of the nation on the basis of trade." And that with a social status which is both doubtful and contradictory. Their status is that of "non-Whites being treated in part as Whites." It is virtually within each province's jurisdiction to close the doors of public schools, primary and secondary, to the Japanese. As it happens, children of members of the Japanese Consulate-General in Pretoria are going to far-away private schools, while there are public schools close by.

While in Johannesburg, I was refused entry on more than one occasion to restaurants meant for the Europeans only. To protest this kind of situation, it would be necessary for Japan to assume a solid "posture" of some sort. If we are to place the claim that we should be treated as Whites on the strength of the Group Areas Act, it would amount to saying "discrimination in favour of the Japanese against other coloured races." The Japanese in South Africa believe in the justice of their opposition to racial discrimination, but they, in their beliefs, wander between a sense of humiliating embarrassments and that of justice, the former originating in their being distinguished from the Europeans, the latter in that the same Asian race is being treated differently...⁸⁾.

Mr. Arima did not use the term "Honorary Whites" as such. As far as *The Asahi Shimbun* is concerned, I believe it was the article written by Mr. Shiba, printed in the 1 June 1967 issue of the paper which employed the term for the first time (p.3). Mr. Shiba stated in clear terms that the Japanese in South Africa were nothing but "Honorary Whites." During his sojourn in the Republic, Mr. Shiba was received very politely by Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster in Cape Town "in spite of the latter's heavy schedule."

Since around 1966 or 1967, books and newspaper articles started pouring out in Japan regarding the treatment of the non-Whites in South Africa in general and Japanese residents in particular. For one thing, Masato Ito, who was on the editorial committee of *The Asahi*, wrote in 1971 a book entitled *Inside the Republic of South Africa* (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha), which was revised

in 1992, relating the experiences he had accumulated in South Africa during his three-month journey there in 1970.

In 1988 a book by Jun Morikawa of Tokai University appeared under the title *South Africa and Japan:History, Structure, Problems in the Relations between the Two Nations* (Tokyo: Dobunkan Shuppan).

More recently, Makoto Katsumata, Assistant Professor at Meiji Gakuin University, published *Gendai Africa Nyumon* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), in which we find a chapter entitled “The Japanese and the Africans : What the Policy of Apartheid Taught Us.”

Naoto Amaki of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote *Mandela's South Africa: Apartheid and the Japanese Response* (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1995), a book which I will quote later in this monograph.

So many articles appeared about the Japanese in the Republic of South Africa in journals and newspapers that I can quote only a few: *Monthly Africa* of May 1974; *The Asahi* of 16 and 17 April 1976, p. 7 respectively; *The Yomiuri* of 9 May 1976; *The Asahi* of 3 June 1976, p. 10 (evening edition); *The Asahi* of 19 June 1978, p. 4, etc.

The tone of these books and articles was, generally speaking, rather critical of the Government of South Africa and some of the Japanese in that country who apparently availed themselves of the situation there. The Japanese soon learned to express their abhorrence to the policy of apartheid by other means, too. For example, an “anti-apartheid exhibition” was planned in 1988, and in the same year, a strong appeal to the fellow Japanese to boycott articles imported from South Africa was organized by a group of Japanese⁹⁾.

4. JAPAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1)

Ever since Japan was admitted into the United Nations in December 1956, she often raised her voice at the General Assembly—in the plenary sessions and in its committees, and when elected to be a non-permanent member, at the Security Council, against racial discrimination in South Africa resulting from the latter's policy of apartheid. One can say assuredly that Japan, until South Africa abandoned her policy of apartheid in June 1991, maintained her adamant attitude toward that policy of South Africa. In that sense, Japan acted in harmony with most of the other members of the United Nations in general and the Afro-Asian group within the ONU, of which she was a member, in particular. Japan, however, upheld the concepts of moral persuasion and the pressure of world public opinion as the most effective means of bringing South Africa's policy of apartheid to an end. She had no hesitation, therefore, in voting for draft resolutions calling upon members of the United Nations to apply moral pressure on the Government of South Africa; when Japan felt that a draft resolution put forward was extreme, she either voted against it or refrained from voting.

Thus, Mr. Shintaro Fukushima, the Representative of Japan to the XVIIIth General Assembly of the United Nations, told the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on 23 October 1963, explaining the reason why Japan had voted against Resolution 1761 (XVII) in 1962:

We did so, in brief, because we had honest doubts about the propriety, in the sense of their effectiveness for the objective in view, namely the elimination of Apartheid in South Africa, of certain of the measures contemplated in that resolution which we felt were too extreme at that time and therefore likely to be counter-productive and damaging to the majority, oppressed population. We did so also because we had honest doubts about the propriety of the General Assembly, with regard to certain clauses of Resolution 1761, usurping, in effect responsibilities which we still feel are within the prerogatives of the Security Council, at least in the first instance¹⁰⁾.

From Japan's many responses to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject, the lengthy statement made on 1 December 1965 by Ambassador Akira Matsui, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, is, in my view, most comprehensive. Some portions of it are reproduced here, and others will be quoted in other appropriate sections of this monograph. The statement was not only very comprehensive, but quite illustrative of the stance which the Japanese Government had taken over so many decades with respect to racial problems:

1. (a)... Our policy of opposition to every kind of racial discrimination is nothing new. It is one of the most basic and most important policies of Japanese diplomacy, and has been so for a great many years. It is a policy that we have persistently pursued for more than the past several decades. In the background of our strong stand against apartheid, one must view the long history of the fight of my Government against racial discrimination. Japan was the first modern state of a coloured race, to which we are proud to belong, to emerge into an international world dominated practically, at that time, by the white race. In the process of our development, Japan faced thick walls of racial discrimination in various parts of the world, and we had a very hard time in our effort to surmount these barriers. We did our best and we muddled through this important phase of Japan's modern history. No one can possibly doubt that the Japanese people, who have struggled through so many difficult, discriminatory days in the past, are now so fervently, and from the bottom of their hearts, opposed to apartheid with the greatest determination.

I do not want to dwell upon our own history, but I should not think it too inappropriate to mention briefly an historical episode, which has, I believe, an important bearing on the Japanese policy against apartheid at the present time. I am sure that a great many of my distinguished colleagues in this Committee will recall the efforts made by the representatives of Japan to establish the principle of racial equality at the Versailles Conference. Incidentally, my father was among the representatives.

(b) In the drafting Committee of the League of Nations in 1919, the Japanese representatives made every effort to enshrine the principle of racial equality in the covenant of the League. Their efforts were, most unhappily, in vain. Despite their failure, the Japanese representatives continued their eager endeavours to attain the goal they so ardently desired.

To make it easier for other representatives to accept the principle of racial equality, the Japanese representatives gave up the idea of stipulating a completely independent clause concerning that principle and, instead, proposed inserting a new, rather flexible clause, as a pendant to a clause on religious equality...

This proposal was, however, also rejected in the atmosphere of that time, the excuse being that the idea was very noble, but of such a highly controversial character that it would be wiser to postpone, for the moment, consideration of it. Consideration was not given to our proposal and it lapsed into deep oblivion.

Nevertheless, in spite of these unsuccessful attempts, our representatives persisted with characteristic determination to establish the principle of racial equality in yet another way. They made another proposal to write a small preambular paragraph concerning the principle. This was written in such common and general terms that it would really have very little meaning to our eyes nowadays. Most regrettably, however, even this very modest proposal was blocked by opposition of the minority representatives. At long last, the Japanese representative [Baron Nobuaki Makino], at a plenary meeting of the Versailles Conference on April 28, 1919, closed his speech with the following remarks:

“... This [the laying down of a principle of racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations] is a demand that is based on a deep-rooted national conviction. They [the Japanese people] will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League of Nations in the future.”

(c) No one could possibly regret more than we Japanese that such strenuous and very lonely efforts on the part of our representatives failed to bear fruit nearly half of a century ago. Time passed and a quarter of a century later the principle of racial equality that we had so vigorously advocated at Versailles was finally incorporated into the Preamble and various relevant articles of the Charter of the United Nations at San Francisco. Japan was ruined by the Second World War. But, meanwhile, the great winds of racial independence and equality had begun to blow with irresistible force, first from Asia, then from Africa, and finally they swept all over the world. Bowing under these great winds, many new nations were born, the principle of racial equality became firmer day by day, the last vestige of moral excuse for racial discrimination vanished, and it is going to be driven from the surface of the globe.

It may be rather difficult for any outsider to understand to what extent and how heartily the Japanese people have so persistently struggled to bring about true equality among the races of mankind, and how much we have been pleased to see this great, relentless tide of human liberation through the centuries reach its apogee.

But this is not enough, of course; we are fully aware of the great barrier reefs of apartheid as one of the few obstacles remaining in the historical movement for racial equality of our century and generation...

(f) Some may believe that it is too lukewarm an approach to rely upon pressures in the form of mere requests or appeals to the Government of South Africa to abolish its iniquitous system of apartheid. We hear the voices demanding that, since such measures have not proved to be

effective, far stronger physical pressures must inevitably be invoked immediately against that Government.

The light of our own long experiences in the struggle for racial equality, we, the Japanese people, can very well understand what those who take this view have in mind. At the same time, however, is it utterly useless to exert non-physical pressures with the greatest of perseverance on those who continue to support apartheid in South Africa?

As to the possibility of other measures, my delegation considers it most important for the nations concerned to maintain the closest relationship and to take steadily, from a practical point of view, the necessary preparatory steps. With our deep concern about the problem of apartheid, we have the highest respect and sympathy for the tremendous efforts made by the Afro-Asian nations to solve this question.

2. (a)... May I turn to the subject of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are so easy to talk about but nobody can deny how extremely difficult it is to put them into practice in any effective way. First of all, if economic sanctions were to be applied to South Africa under the auspices of the United Nations, this would have to be done lawfully, in other words, strictly in compliance with the provisions of the Charter. Secondly, let us not delude ourselves; it is quite clear that unless the effectiveness of such sanctions is fully ensured, their purposes can hardly be achieved with any satisfactory result.

(b) The application of economic sanctions through the United Nations falls primarily under the jurisdiction of the Security Council... It follows logically that the application of economic sanctions to South Africa falls primarily under the jurisdiction of the Council and the same may be said with respect to other sanctions, such as the severance of diplomatic relations and so on.

(c) Economic sanctions, Mr. Chairman, whatever form they may take, must be truly effective, if they are to serve any useful purpose at all... It means that States concerned must be determined to pursue such sanctions faithfully while keeping in closest contact with each other, in order to ensure that each member will pay its equitable share of sacrifice.

3. Mr. Chairman,

At this point I should like to stress that Japan has been and is pursuing an arms embargo against South Africa in compliance with the Security Council's resolutions. Actually this was the policy of the Japanese Government since long before the adoption of those resolutions. The policy will remain unchanged in the future, as we believe that the arms embargo is a realistic and effective measure inhibiting the Government of South Africa from strengthening its policy of apartheid, without involving any sacrifice on the part of the majority of the people of South Africa...

5. Thus, Mr. Chairman, Japan, in line with the basic position it has consistently maintained for many past decades in opposition to racial discrimination, is determined to continue to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in every effort to bring apartheid to an end. If and when lawful and effective measures of economic sanction against South Africa are taken by the Security Council, Japan is prepared to cooperate. We shall continue strictly to enforce our arms embargo against South Africa.

The record to racial freedom and equality is still a most difficult one, beset by a number of barriers and attended by many sad trials and tribulations. But we are not only most earnestly hopeful but also confident that the time will soon come, as it inevitably must, when the policies of apartheid will perish from the face of the earth. Let us cooperate in our tireless efforts to this end ¹¹⁾.

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In spite of the serious efforts made by the Japanese diplomats at the United Nations, African member states attacked with increasing severity the principal trade partners of South Africa, including Japan. Concern was often expressed in the *Diplomatic Bluebook* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan as the intensity of the criticism against Japan grew with the years ¹²⁾.

When in 1965 Japan offered herself as a two-year member of the Security Council of the United Nations, some African states delivered an attack on her, as was expected.

On 10 December 1965, Japan did gain a seat in the Security Council; thereupon she apparently felt an urgent necessity to squash any criticism against her policy vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa which might be possibly raised while she was seated in the Security Council. On 14 December, Foreign Minister Shiina took the floor at a cabinet meeting in Tokyo, reporting on the circumstances under which Japan had been elected a member of the Security Council, and he stated that his country would be obliged to alter its “policy of a double standard” and take a more decisive attitude with regard to the white-black situation in South Africa, even if it meant inflicting losses in the trade relations with that latter country. In the press of the following day [15 December], it was reported that no objection was raised in the cabinet meeting against Mr. Shiina’s statement.

However, as was reported by Mr. Arima of *The Asahi Shimbun* (Chapter 3 *supra*), this statement seemed to have aroused “considerable unrest” within the Japanese community in the Republic of South Africa.

* * *

One could say, however, that Japan acted, generally speaking, in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations.

To begin with, as was observed in Chapter 2, post-WW II Japan did not maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa (it was only in 1992 that such relations were established), but limited her relations to the consular level.

The Security Council passed Resolution 182 on 4 December 1963 (S/5471), which the General Assembly in its Resolution 1978 (XVIII) of 16 December of that year endorsed. It called upon all states to cease “the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and amunition in South Africa.” Japan, however, had denied, long before the

adoption of the resolution by the Security Council, export licences for such sale and shipment to South Africa. Mr. Fukushima, in the statement quoted earlier on 23 October 1963, said: "On the one hand, an arms embargo can in no way harm the majority population and, on the other, it tangibly supplements the concept of continuing pressure on the Government of South Africa..."¹³⁾

As to other measures which were recommended to be taken by the United Nations organs, Ambassador Hideo Kagami, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, told the Special Political Committee on 30 November 1988 when the Committee was discussing a draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa":

It [the Government of Japan] prohibits direct investment by Japanese nationals, companies, or their affiliates in South Africa, a policy which it has observed for more than twenty years.

It strictly limits sports, cultural, and educational exchanges with South Africa; it does not issue tourist visas to South African nationals, and discourages Japanese citizens from traveling to South Africa.

Japan prohibits trade in arms and all cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear field. It also prohibits import of iron and steel from that country¹⁴⁾.

Amaki, whose book *Mandela's South Africa* is mentioned in Chapter 3, writes that the measures pursued by the Government of Japan were, taken as a whole, more harsh than those carried out by the other Western countries, except in the matter of trade. What is more, he continues, in way of the application of these measures against the Republic of South Africa, Japan got more and more stringent as the situation in the Republic worsened (p.97).

As a matter of fact, when President de Klerk told Parliament on 17 June 1991 that South Africa had finally removed statutory discrimination from its system, *The Cape Times* of 18 June reported (p. 2):

Japan's Foreign Ministry pledged yesterday [17 June] to review its policy of strict sanctions against South Africa following sweeping legal changes in the country...

And in a statement, the Japanese Consular-general in Johannesburg [*sic*] praised yesterday's repeal of the Population Registration Act as "an historic event in the process toward establishing a non-racial democracy."...

Japanese newspapers said... that the government would ease its bans on sports, cultural and educational exchanges and on issuing tourist visas and on its public servants using South African Airways...

5. JAPAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS (2)

It is worth noting that the peculiar status given to the Japanese in South Africa attracted attention of the Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly as early as

1962.

On 8 October 1962, Mr. J. E. Jantuah of Ghana took the floor, and, according to the *Official Records*, he said:

In February of 1962, it had been reported that shortly after South Africa had signed a contract to supply Japan with £ 90 million worth of pig iron, the Government had directed that Japanese in South Africa were to be regarded as White, although Chinese and other orientals were to remain classified as non-white. It would be interesting to learn the official Japanese reaction to that unsavoury concession. It had also been rumoured for some time that the Government of another Asian State was contemplating negotiations with the Republic of South Africa for a similar concession... such an act would give the official sanction to that country's Government to apartheid¹⁵⁾.

On 25 October 1962, Mr. Fukushima made the following remark at the Special Political Committee:

May I... add a few words in connection with a point raised in this Committee on the first day. On October 8, the distinguished representative from Ghana cited a certain report which appeared in one South African publication about the treatment of Japanese nationals in that country. The report in question is that Japanese nationals are being regarded by the Government of South Africa as white as a result of a recent contract for the export of iron ingot from South Africa to Japan. Whoever the journalist is who circulated this report, I should like to point out that there is no truth in any report that the treatment of Japanese nationals in South Africa has been changed because of any trade contract whatever¹⁶⁾.

In spite of Mr. Fukushima's intervention, Mr. Harry R. Amonoo, the Representative of Ghana, took up the same subject on 9 October 1963. The *Official Records* state:

In 1962 [327th meeting] the representative of Ghana had pointed out in the Special Political Committee that South Africa had decided to accept Japan as a White country. He was uncertain about the reply of the Japanese representative. His delegation would, however, wish to be assured during the current year that Japan had refused to accept that designation and that the Japanese were proud of their colour and were part and parcel of the African-Asian family¹⁷⁾.

Mr. Fukushima took the floor again on 23 October 1963 at the Special Political Committee and said as follows:

My delegation had the opportunity to listen to the comprehensive statement made on October 9th by the distinguished representative of Ghana. In the course of that statement,...

he referred to the status of Japanese in South Africa. As our distinguished colleague himself reminded us, he made similar references last year in this Committee and I had hoped that the reply I made on that occasion would not have left him or anyone else in any state of uncertainty.

But since the question was raised, I find myself once again obliged to answer the question put to us on October 9th.

In the first place, my delegation wishes to make it clear once again that the strict legal status of our countrymen in South Africa has remained unchanged, since they first went to that country a number of years ago. They have not been declared, in legal terms, to be whites, classified as whites, nor granted the status of whites.

Apart from these legal aspects of the problem, we are not responsible, nor are we interested in whatever unilateral gestures be made toward the small number of Japanese in South Africa. Our strongest sentiments against the abominable practice in South Africa will never be affected in any circumstances.

If I have understood our distinguished colleague correctly, he also asked, in essence, whether we are not proud to be part and parcel of the Afro-Asian family.

The answer is a categorical—Yes! We are proud to be Japanese, we are proud to be Asian, we are proud to be part and parcel of the Afro-Asian family, but, most of all, we are proud to be part and parcel of humanity, without distinction as to race, creed, or colour. And we abhor any form of racial discrimination anywhere in the world, and particularly in South Africa, where Apartheid, as the settled policy of the Government of that unhappy country, perpetuates a most virulent form of that cancerous disease¹⁸⁾.

At the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, however, Japan was attacked again, by Ghana, in December 1965, concerning her attitude vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa. It should be recalled that at that time Japan was offering herself as a candidate for non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.

On 1 December 1965, Mr. F. S. Arkhurst of Ghana intervened. According to the *Official Records*, he [Mr. Arkhurst] felt it was his duty to make a few comments on the increasing involvement of Japan in the industrial and economic development of South Africa. It was distressing to the people of Ghana, continues the *Official Records*, that Japan should be prepared, for the sake of economic gain, to accept the status of “honorary white men” for persons of Japanese origin conferred upon them by South Africa¹⁹⁾.

Ambassador Matsui, the Representative of Japan, said on the same day of 1 December 1965:

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, as to the reference concerning our status in South Africa made in the course of the present debate, I simply would like to say that, as I understand and as our representative, Mr. Shintaro Fukushima, pointed out in this Committee two years ago, our legal status in that country has remained unchanged. Japanese have not been declared to be whites, classified as whites, nor granted the status of whites²⁰⁾.

On 3 December 1965, Mr. Marof Achkar took the floor and the following was recorded:

The Japanese representative had stated that the legal status of the Japanese in the Republic of South Africa had remained unchanged and that they had never been declared to be Whites by the Government of that country...

It was true that Japanese men could not marry white women or Japanese women white men, and that they had no voting rights in South Africa. However, as a result of administrative decisions dictated by commercial interests, Japanese were admitted into hotels and hospitals reserved for Whites and were allowed to work in offices subject to strict racial segregation. There was thus an assimilation which was in fact an insult to the dignity of Japan and to the great Japanese civilization, and it was that unspeakable insult that the African countries would have liked the Japanese to reject as absolutely intolerable... ²¹⁾

6. EVOLUTION OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOUTH AFRICA (1)

The statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) give us the volume of trade which the Republic of South Africa maintains with the rest of the world, but, for our purposes, it will be sufficient to show the Republic's exports to, and its imports from, the principal industrial countries from 1978 to 1999.

It is clear from **Table 1** that Japan ranked high as South Africa's export market during the period concerned. In 1981, she was second only to the United States of America, and in 1982, second to none. In the ensuing years of 1983 to 1990, Japan was ranked after the United States, but in 1991, it was Italy and Germany which exceeded Japan and the United States. In 1993 and 1994, Japan was placed after Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom. The more recent years witnessed a marked rise of the United Kingdom as South Africa's export market.

As a source of imports from South Africa, Japan also ranked high among the most important suppliers. **Table 2** tells us that South Africa imported more from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Germany than from Japan during the period from 1979 to 1999 except 1992 and 1993, the years in which Japan overtook the United Kingdom, only to be surpassed by the latter in 1994 and afterwards.

It is known that South Africa's trade with the United Kingdom, until the latter joined the European Communities in 1973, was considerably greater than with any other country.

Since South Africa signed a protocol of accession and became the 86th signatory of the fourth Lomé Convention on 24 April 1997, connecting the European Union and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific countries ²²⁾, it may well be that the importance of trade between South Africa, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and other EU members, on the other, will increase in the future.

Table 1 South Africa's Exports to Industrial Countries (*Millions of U.S. Dollars*)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
United States	1,559	1,679	2,126	1,745	1,220	1,578	1,458	1,374	1,521	1,972	1,805	1,861	1,821	1,618	1,717	1,681	1,254	1,341	1,573	1,732	1,876	2,486
Canada	130	203	266	233	123	107	117	93	106	133	122	126	126	103	94	121	136	137	185	200	242	272
Australia	61	88	111	105	82	93	119	109	136	156	143	148	122	59	126	159	188	282	381	358	334	438
Japan	876	1,129	1,551	1,591	1,533	1,533	1,335	1,279	1,434	1,835	1,680	1,732	1,639	1,666	1,319	1,335	1,171	1,409	1,613	1,525	1,309	1,590
Belgium	297	404	411	353	347	347	287	283	308	407	372	384	463	595	703	712	735	896	850	768	821	859
France	318	418	524	529	415	415	385	275	281	395	361	373	521	602	353	254	283	342	451	442	539	703
Germany	767	1,085	1,029	885	785	785	676	567	646	814	745	768	1,179	1,744	1,055	944	1,044	1,255	1,158	1,248	1,479	2,128
Ireland	64	76	66	58	48	48	48	40	41	57	52	54	41	18	102	99	52	80	64	62	70	63
Italy	227	406	489	435	344	344	442	463	522	664	608	626	1,387	2,240	582	450	497	664	627	703	731	1,283
Netherlands	230	253	310	269	255	255	413	610	700	876	802	827	586	200	676	658	595	844	784	918	1,124	952
Norway	20	25	27	22	35	35	31	29	36	42	38	39	23	33	187	174	130	117	154	149	38	33
Spain	111	131	123	104	106	106	109	142	184	204	187	193	266	422	348	287	339	501	653	663	482	552
Sweden	19	24	24	30	24	24	28	22	21	32	29	30	18	...	2	5	14	28	52	31	78	39
Switzerland	533	1,834	1,597	1,340	947	947	1,171	594	725	853	781	805	616	288	1,887	2,417	1,710	23	698	649	281	197
United Kingdom	1,401	1,147	1,779	1,360	1,300	1,300	742	969	1,042	1,390	1,273	1,312	1,473	1,542	1,586	1,450	1,673	2,285	3,043	3,736	2,081	2,534

Source :IMF, *Direction of International Trade Statistics Yearbook*. For years 1978-1984, the 1985 edition, p. 356; for years 1985-1991, the 1992 edition, p. 356; for years 1992-1997, the 1999 edition, p. 417; for years 1998 end 1999, the 2000 editon, p. 419.

Note : Prior to 1997, trade data for Belgium are recorded as trade of the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU).

Table 2 South Africa's Imports from Industrial Countries (f. o. b.; *Millions of U.S. Dollars*)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
United States	1,137	1,478	2,527	3,021	2,484	2,217	2,375	1,429	1,467	1,951	2,399	2,343	2,077	2,113	2,518	2,391	3,535	3,181	3,462	3,490	3,499	3,141
Canada	95	115	180	247	178	139	166	120	126	163	201	196	152	93	146	150	300	280	226	353	268	175
Australia	78	78	128	169	170	155	188	116	119	158	194	190	153	139	221	212	302	456	662	711	638	567
Japan	947	952	1,669	2,245	1,711	1,709	1,934	1,028	1,187	1,403	1,726	1,686	1,613	1,639	1,951	2,278	2,223	2,724	2,202	2,090	2,027	1,772
Belgium	132	160	224	286	217	211	240	188	210	256	315	308	350	364	415	406	508	613	544	494	452	500
France	547	559	703	1,018	708	556	568	482	480	658	810	791	668	2,839	720	641	765	1,036	915	1,015	1,126	1,008
Germany	1,466	1,555	2,399	2,680	2,503	2,005	2,339	1,729	1,880	2,361	2,903	2,835	2,834	...	3,011	2,840	3,657	4,419	4,034	3,796	3,711	3,409
Ireland	13	25	27	40	44	50	48	34	35	47	58	56	49	47	72	96	129	168	187	287	341	386
Italy	254	298	567	724	569	462	525	327	343	446	549	536	606	627	646	638	841	1,104	1,179	1,073	1,037	903
Netherlands	172	188	254	287	236	219	271	207	239	282	347	339	342	390	438	424	533	634	675	715	678	673
Norway	39	55	115	80	67	91	105	86	91	118	145	142	82	1	9	20	21	28	26	35	27	40
Spain	55	65	92	124	101	90	120	81	86	111	137	134	131	122	126	116	146	215	255	284	408	275
Sweden	91	121	186	204	172	146	205	131	142	178	219	214	127	14	45	72	233	409	449	463	450	335
Switzerland	193	216	308	358	296	259	265	215	241	294	361	353	362	342	429	402	555	658	683	621	695	511
United Kingdom	1,200	1,491	2,242	2,467	2,029	1,695	1,660	1,256	1,340	1,715	2,108	2,059	2,052	1,807	1,887	2,004	2,524	2,965	3,099	3,164	2,662	2,222

Source and Note : Same as Table 1.

6. EVOLUTION OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOUTH AFRICA (2)

Nobody can cast doubt on the fact that Japan, in the many years when the policy of apartheid was being pursued by the Republic of South Africa, was an important trade partner of the latter, both as a market and a supplier. This very fact was often criticized by African states within the United Nations and other international fora.

Mr. Achkar of Guinea, for instance, made an intervention on 29 November 1965, and it was recorded as follows:

... between 1959 and 1964, South Africa's trade with West Germany had increased by approximately 69 per cent, with Italy by 83 per cent, and with Japan by 182 per cent. The delegation of Guinea was particularly shocked by such a selfish attitude on the part of Japan, which aspired to represent the Afro-Asian States on the Security Council. Some of the departments of the Japanese Foreign Ministry had actually calculated that once Japanese exports to South Africa reached the figure of \$150 million, Japan would not suffer any loss, even if all the Afro-Asian Governments were to impose sanctions on it ²³⁾.

Let me reproduce a portion of the already-quoted statement which Ambassador Matsui made on 1 December 1965 at the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly:

I think it is pertinent for me to make a few comments on the trade between Japan and South Africa. As all the distinguished representatives know, Japan is a small nation from the point of view of area, smaller than the state of California in the United States. Approximately 85% of our total area is mountainous, thus severely limiting the extent of arable land. We are extremely poor in natural resources. The population of Japan is about 100 million, roughly half that of the United States. To feed such a number of people with our limited resources is impossible. Thus, our foreign trade is literally our life-line, it is not a luxury but really vital to us and, consequently, we have endeavoured to trade as widely as possible throughout the world. At this point, I should like to make it clear that Japan has strictly refrained from investments in South Africa. Furthermore, we are conscious of all our international obligations, including, by no means least, those flowing from the Charter, and we shall honour them in the future as we have in the past. Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, as to the Japanese press report concerning our trade with South Africa, which was grossly misquoted and erroneously presented during the current debate, I would simply like to say that Japan, happily, is a free country and we have a free press. The Government cannot reasonably be expected to take responsibility for what our free press may print with regard to one question or another.

Meanwhile, as part of our trade system, we are trying very hard to promote not only our trade but also our economic and technical assistance relations with the developing countries. We shall be more than pleased if our efforts can serve to help those nations in the development of their economies. My delegation believes, in view of our own long experience, that this is a very

important factor that will have a significant bearing on the eventual abolition of apartheid...²⁴⁾

* * *

On 5 December 1988, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 43/50 C entitled “Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa” which, in its operative paragraph 3, called upon “those States which have increased their trade with South Africa and, particularly, Japan, which recently emerged as the most important trading partner of South Africa, to sever trade relations with South Africa,” and, in its operative paragraph 5, requested the Security Council “to consider immediate action under Chapter VII of the Charter with a view to applying comprehensive and mandatory sanctions” against South Africa.

In the course of the debate on the draft resolution at the Special Political Committee, Ambassador Kagami spoke as follows on 30 November 1988 in his already-quoted intervention:

... Concerning trade with South Africa, it was reported that Japan had increased its trade and become South Africa's largest trading partner last year. I wish to point out, however, that this was mainly a function of the dramatic appreciation of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar and other currencies. Japan's trade with South Africa has declined in yen terms every year since 1984, which resulted in a 27% decrease during the years 1984 to 87. I should also like to mention that the Government of Japan has taken additional steps this year to further discourage Japanese business ties with South Africa. In fact, the Foreign and Trade Ministers have made personal appeals to business leaders in Japan to exercise maximum restraint in trading with that country. As a result, there are clear indications that Japanese trade with South Africa is decreasing this year.

And Ambassador Kagami continued:

Given the above-mentioned strict policies of my Government with regard to economic relations with South Africa, paragraph 3 of the draft resolution... indicates a misunderstanding of Japan's record to date. We believe that a country should not be singled out for blame on the basis of trade statistics, which are always open to interpretation. Furthermore, my country generally opposes the practice of name-calling in the resolutions of the United Nations. For these reasons, my delegation calls for the deletion of the reference to Japan in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, and will request that this be put to a separate vote²⁵⁾.

On 5 December, before the draft resolution was put to vote, Ambassador Kagami took the floor and requested again a separate vote on operative paragraph 3²⁶⁾.

His request, however, was voted down, and the draft resolution was adopted with 123 states voting for it, 12 against it, and 19 abstentions.

It is evident, from Tables 1 and 2, that South Africa's exports to and imports from Japan, put

together, represented, in 1987, an impressive amount of 3,238 billion U.S. dollars, closely followed by Germany (3, 175 million dollars), and the United Kingdom (3, 105 million dollars). One should, however, take into account, as Ambassador Kagami told the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, the drastic appreciation of the Japanese yen against other currencies at that time.

One should not fail to notice that in 1987 the volume of trade between the United States and South Africa exceeded that between Japan and South Africa, as U. S. imports from South Africa, owing, beyond the shadow of a doubt, to the depreciation of the dollar, amounted to 1,951 million dollars.

* * *

Since 1964, Japan's exports have consistently exceeded her imports as far as most of her trade partners are concerned ; but with the Republic of South Africa, Japan tends to have an "unfavourable" trade balance, as should be clear from Tables 1 and 2. Limiting ourselves to the period between 1980 and 1991, South Africa exported more to Japan than the former imported from the latter, except the years 1986, 1987, and 1989 to 1991, when the yen was excessively appreciated.

The reason for this excess of Japan's imports from the Republic of South Africa over her exports to the Republic is structural : Japan imports from South Africa such mineral resources as platinum, manganese, chromium ore, vanadium, gold, coal, and iron ore in addition to such field crops as maize, sugar cane, and fruits. As a matter of fact, among South Africa's mineral deposits are three-fourths or more of the world's reserves of chromium ore, manganese, and platinum, plus nearly half of vanadium, and Japan heavily depends upon them. It would be difficult for her to secure other suppliers of these rare deposits or to find substitutes for them, at least in the immediate future, in terms of profitability.

8. REFUSAL BY SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES OF A JAPANESE JOCKEY'S VISA

There occurred an incident in 1970 which might suggest that the Government of South Africa was still applying its racist policy to the Japanese in the field of sports.

In September 1967, the Pietermaritzburg and Benoni Turf Clubs invited the Japan Racing Association (JRA) to compete in international races to be held at Scottsville and Germiston on 28 February and 7 March 1970 respectively, and the JRA decided to send a jockey, Mr. Suetō Masuzawa, along with Mr. Yoshitaro Yoshimura, Secretary of the Association, to these races. When in early 1970 the JRA applied at the Consulate-General of the Republic of South Africa in Tokyo for entry visas on their behalf, however, the application was turned down by Mr. S. L. Muller, the Interior Minister of the Republic of South Africa. When the Government of Japan lodged a protest on 24 February, the Interior Minister informed it through the Consulate General in Tokyo that the visas would be issued. But by then Mr. Masuzawa had already made

commitments to take part in other races in Japan, and when the Benoni Turf Club renewed its invitation, the JRA had no choice but to decline it “with thanks.”²⁷⁾

Interesting was the reaction on the part of the opposition parties and newspapers of South Africa. Mr. G. J. Jacobs, Chairman of the Witwatersrand Central Council of the United Party said : “The mind boggles at this inexplicable action. It is plain crazy... In the face of the HNP threat, the Government has destroyed whatever remained of its outward policy.”²⁸⁾

Progressive Party leader Jan Steytler ridiculed the ban on the Japanese jockey, saying : “We’ve never heard before of any Japanese who intended to sabotage our country internally. We have had good trade relations with the Japanese and they have never caused us any embarrassment.”²⁹⁾

The Cape Times of 24 February said :

The Government’s ruling defies all attempts at rational explanation even in terms of the peculiar logic that has been applied to these matters in the past.

The Japanese, it will be noted, are held to be honorary whites when buying South African pig iron, entertaining South African businessmen at cocktail parties...

By what canon of nationalist ideology do they cease to be acceptable when astride a racehorse ?³⁰⁾

Although the Consulate-General of South Africa in Tokyo gave no reason when it refused visas to Mr. Masuzawa and Mr. Yoshimura, it was reported that the Government of Pretoria had told the turf clubs that Japan had no “traditional sporting relations” with South Africa³¹⁾. A UPI dispatch from Pretoria said, however :

The Government was recently involved in a similar case, refusing a visa to U.S. Negro Arthur Ashe.

Non-White sportsmen could only compete in multi-racial events in South Africa where “traditional” ties existed with the Republic. This has been given as [the] reason why Maoris were welcome to tour with [a] New Zealand rugby team later this year.

But then again, a team of Japanese swimmers came to South Africa in 1962 and broke several records competing against white swimmers.

Japanese visitors here enjoy [a] status of “honorary Whites” and thus use all facilities South Africa offers its White population. Political observers did not believe the ban on Masuzawa would change this in any way.³²⁾

9. THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AFRICA NOW

As I stated in Part One of this monograph, Senator J. de Klerk, Minister of the Interior of the Republic of South Africa, said on 1 May 1962 at the House of Assembly : “There are at the moment 50 Japanese in the country, of whom the majority are not permanent residents. They live as families spread over some of the big cities, and they are therefore not a settled community in the

Republic.”

On 16 May 1962, the Minister said at the Senate : “When the question of the Japanese was raised we found that there were 50 of them in a few large cities and, Mr. President, only one Japanese has permanent domicile in this country.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan took a census, on 1 March 1968, through its missions overseas, of Japanese nationals residing in foreign countries and areas for a period exceeding three months, those having permanent domicile abroad but retaining Japanese nationality included.

According to the report on the results of the census, (a) there were, in March 1968, 206 Japanese in South Africa all told ; (b) 10 of them were in Cape Town, and 189 in Johannesburg (No figures available as to the residents in Pretoria and other cities.) ; (c) of the 206 Japanese residents in South Africa, 132 were trade representatives and their families, two were bank representatives, 54 were from other firms and their families, two medical doctors, four technical advisers, two students, and 10 others ³³⁾. There certainly was a considerable increase in the size of the Japanese community in South Africa between 1962 and 1968.

As from 1972, the Foreign Ministry of Japan has been carrying out on 1 October every year a survey of Japanese nationals abroad, and the results are processed and published in the spring of the following year under the title of *Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas*. The following is the number of Japanese residents in South Africa from 1972 to 2000, compiled from different editions of the *Annual Report* ³⁴⁾:

Table 3 South Africa's Exports to Industrial Countries (*Millions of U.S. Dollars*)
To read : Number of Japanese Residents in South Africa

	Number of Residents	With Permanent Domicile
1972	567
1973	676
1974	696
1975	644
1976	653
1977	523	1
1978	520	1
1979	557
1980	611	3
1981	639
1982	652
1983	756	2
1984	743	2
1985	801	4
1986	776	5
1987	710	10
1988	604	22
1989	542	12
1990	530	30
1991	548	24
1992	567	19
1993	629	42
1994	642	75
1995	3,136	74
1996	3,013	78
1997	2,801	28
1998	2,747	91
1999	1,540	98
2000	1,210	125

The number of the Japanese in major cities in South Africa is given in each *Annual Report*, especially with regard to Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Pretoria, and, between 1975 and 1978 and after the year 1984, Durban³⁵⁾ :

Table 4 South Africa's Imports from Industrial Countries (f. o. b.; *Millions of U.S. Dollars*)
 To read : Number of Japanese in Major Cities in South Africa

	Cape Town	Johannesburg	Pretoria	Durban
1972	37	505	19
1973	27	482	26
1974	30	538	45
1975	40	516	23	11
1976	31	549	37	13
1977	36	442	23	16
1978	21	460	15	13
1979	37	476	24
1980	36	515	33
1981	38	243	19
1982	38	525	14
1983	47	614	22
1984	45	631	23	31
1985	45	679	24	33
1986	44	659	26	34
1987	55	581	28	33
1988	39	503	23	30
1989	41	433	24	19
1990	52	425	24	19
1991	52	433	30	28
1992	52	450	31	23
1993	66	482	38	27
1994	63	494	47	28
1995	2,517	523	51	30
1996	2,374	504	73	30
1997	2,340	564	104	23
1998	1,910	559	75	32
1999	464	572	87	78
2000	499	460	104	114

Toyota Motor Corporation established an assembly factory at Isipingo Beach near Durban, and production was started in September 1962. Statistics with regard to the number of Japanese in Durban, however, are not available for the first years of operation.

Cities other than Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban, are covered as follows in the *Annual Report* :

- (a) In 1975 : 29 Japanese in Vanderbijlpark, 24 in Newcastle, and 1 in Port Elizabeth.
- (b) In 1976 : 18 in Vanderbijlpark, 5 in Newcastle, and 1 in Port Elizabeth.
- (c) In 1977 : 5 in Port Elizabeth, and 1 in Pinetown.
- (d) In 1978 : 8 in Witbank, and 2 in Port Elizabeth.
- (e) In 1979 : 4 in Port Elizabeth, 3 in Stellenbosch, 2 in Krugersdorp, 1 in Pietermaritzburg, and 1 in Vredenburg.
- (f) In 1981 : 43 in Empangeni.
- (g) In 1982 : 52 in Richard's Bay, and 12 in Amanzimtoti.
- (h) In 1983 : 35 in Vanderbijlpark, and 13 in Amanzimtoti.
- (i) In 1988 : 5 in Port Elizabeth, 2 in Pietermaritzburg, and 2 in East London.
- (j) In 1989 : 7 in Umtata, 6 in Newcastle, 5 in Port Elizabeth, 3 in East London, and 2 in Kimberley.
- (k) In 1990 : 5 in Port Elizabeth, 3 in East London, and 3 in Kimberley.
- (l) In 1991 : 3 in East London, and 1 in Port Elizabeth.
- (m) In 1992 : 3 in Port Elizabeth, 3 in Pietermaritzburg, 3 in Transkei, 1 in Vereeniging, and 1 in East London.
- (n) In 1993 : 3 each in East London, Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, and Transkei.
- (o) In 1994 : 3 each in East London, and Transkei.
- (p) In 1995 : 5 in Bloemfontein, 3 in East London, 2 in Midrand (Joburg), 2 in Middelburg, and 2 in Port Elizabeth.
- (q) In 1996 : 9 in Bloemfontein, 7 in Port Elizabeth, 5 in Pietermaritzburg, 3 in East London, and 2 in Middelburg.
- (r) In 1997 : 461 in Port Elizabeth, 6 in Bloemfontein, 2 East London, 2 in Pietermaritzburg, and 1 in Middelburg.
- (s) In 1998 : 132 in Port Elizabeth, and 16 in Vereeniging.
- (t) In 1999 : 58 in Port Elizabeth.
- (u) In 2000 : 20 in Port Elizabeth.

Statistics showing the breakdown by profession of the Japanese residing in the Republic of South Africa are available in the *Annual Report* for the whole of the Republic, and until the 1980 edition, also for major cities.

In two of the early editions, the number of Japanese entering the Republic of South Africa was given in the *Annual Report* :

In 1973 : 3,097

In 1974 : 5,528 ³⁶⁾

It can be said for certain that the Japanese are no longer “a settled community of small numerical importance” in the Republic of South Africa.

CONCLUSION

Japan, until the Meiji Restoration of 1868, had arbitrarily secluded itself from the stream of world influence, and therefore had hardly experienced racial discrimination. After 1868, however, Japan progressed, within the short span of a few decades, into modern, industrial nationhood. When Ambassador Matsui told the Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 1 December 1965 that Japan was the first modern state of a coloured race “to emerge into an international world dominated practically, at that time, by the white race,” I believe he was referring, *inter alia*, to the fact that Japan got rid of, as early as July 1899, the capitulations (which the Japanese termed as “unequal treaties”) signed prior to, and immediately after, the Meiji Restoration with the United States of America and many of the European powers. The capitulatory system, embodying extraterritorial jurisdiction and other privileges in favour of Europeans abroad – merchants, missionaries, scholars, etc. – developed first in the 9th century in Islamic countries, and extended later to Asia and Africa ; but Japan was the first nation in succeeding to abolish the system and to conclude commercial treaties on an equal footing with the Western powers.

But the price was enormous. As Ambassador Matsui said, Japan “faced thick walls of racial discrimination in various parts of the world,” and she “had a very hard time” in her “effort to surmount these barriers.” That is why Japan understands and shares the hardships being encountered by the millions of people in Asia, Africa and elsewhere who are in the process of political and economic development. Racial discrimination in any form is certainly one such hardship, wherever it may be practised.

The fact that Japan must advance her trade extensively with the rest of the world, including the Republic of South Africa, when policies and practices of apartheid were maintained in that Republic, led a section of the South African press to call the Japanese there “Honorary Whites” ironically ; but apartheid, along with that quaint designation, belongs now, fortunately, to “a departed era.”

NOTES

- 1) Naokichi Nakamura and Shunro Oshikawa, *Africa Isshu* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1910), pp. 65, 112-118, 121-123.
- 2) *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* (later *The Asahi Shimbun*), 5 September 1930, p. 4.
- 3) League of Nations, *The Network of World Trade* (Geneva, 1942), pp. 147 ; *Economic Statistical Series 1910-1945* (Geneva, 1922-1948), Book 10, pp. 233, 255, Book 12, pp. 281, 303, Book 13, p. 294, Book 15, p. 294, Book 17, pp. 320, 342, Book 19, pp. 320, 382.
- 4) *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 24 October 1929, p. 4.

- 5) Dr. Shiga in a lecture he gave on 7 April 1923 cited the same figures (VIII, 92 - 116).
- 6) The Consulate-General of Japan in Pretoria was closed officially on 1 April 1997.
- 7) *Kaigai Seikatsu no Tebiki : Africa I* (Tokyo : Sekai no Ugoki-sha, 1999), pp. 216-217. The Japanese Society in South Africa is made up of Japanese individuals residing in the country. Japanese corporations were part of it as corporate members, but they formed in 1992 a Japanese Chamber of Commerce in South Africa. As of April 1998, there were 50 members in the Chamber (*ibid.*).
- 8) *The Asahi Shimbun*, 27 April 1966, p. 3 [translation mine]. Japan's "policy of a double standard" means an opposition *in theory* to the racial discrimination practiced in the Republic of South Africa, and an expansion of trade with the Republic *in practice*.
- 9) *The Asahi Shimbun*, 17 May 1988, p. 14 (evening edition), and 23 May, 1988, p. 3.
- 10) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during XVIIIth Regular Session of the General Assembly, United Nations* (1964), p. 57.
Resolution 1761 (XVII), adopted on 1 November 1962 by the Special Political Committee, and on 6 November 1962 by the General Assembly, requested Member States to take the following measures: (a) breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations; (b) closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag; (c) enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports; (d) boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa; and (e) refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa and companies registered under the laws of South Africa.
- 11) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during XIXth and XXth Regular Sessions of General Assembly, United Nations* (1966), pp. 80-87 ; *Official Records of the General Assembly (XXth Session), Special Political Committee (A / SPC / SR. 472)* (United Nations, 1966), pp. 1-2.
On the subject of the Japanese proposal for a racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations, see, for example, Seth P. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 300-304.
- 12) See, for instance, the 1967 edition, p. 73; the 1968 edition, p. 92; the 1969 edition, p. 245; the 1971 edition, p. 245.
- 13) *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during the XVIIIth Regular Session... (op. cit.)*, p. 56.

- 14) *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during the 43rd Session of General Assembly, United Nations* (1989), p. 50.
- 15) *Official Records of the General Assembly (XVIIth Session), Special Political Committee* (A/SPC/SR. 325-376) (United Nations, 1963), p. 6.
- 16) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during XVIIth Regular Session of General Assembly, United Nations* (1963), p.62.
- 17) *Official Records of the General Assembly (XVIIIth Session), Special Political Committee* (A/SPC/SR. 377-429) (United Nations, 1964), p. 14.
- 18) *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during XVIIIth Regular Session of General Assembly... (op. cit.)*, pp. 59-60.
- 19) *Official Records of the General Assembly (XXth Session), Special Political Committee* (A/SPC/SR. 473), p. 2.
- 20) *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during the XIXth and XXth Regular Sessions of the General Assembly... (op. cit.)*, p. 83.
- 21) *Official Records of the General Assembly (XXth Session), Special Political Committee* (A/SPC/SR. 476), p. 3.
- 22) The protocol provides for the “qualified accession” of South Africa to the Lomé Convention : she is not eligible for resources of the European Development Fund (European Commission, *General Report on the Activities of the European Union 1997* (1998), point 1025. The protocol, revised by the agreement signed on 4 November 1997, entered into effect on 1 June 1998 (European Commission, *Bulletin of the European Union*, June 1998, point 1. 4. 168).
- 23) *Official Records of the General Assembly (XXth Session), Special Political Committee* (A/SPC/SR. 469), p. 3.
- 24) *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during the XIXth and XXth Regular Sessions of the General Assembly... (op. cit.)*, pp. 86-87.
- 25) *Statements Delivered by Delegates of Japan during the 43rd Session of the General Assembly, United Nations (op. cit.)*, pp. 51-52.
- 26) *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

- 27) *The Japan Times*, 26 February 1970, p. 6, and 27 February 1970, p. 6.
- 28) *The Japan Times*, 26 February 1970, p. 6. "HNP" stands for the Herstigte National Party, launched in October 1969 by Gen. James Barry Hertzog.
- 29) *Ibid.*
- 30) *Ibid.*
- 31) *Ibid.*
- 32) *The Japan Times*, 24 February 1970, p. 6.
- 33) Department of Consular and Emigration Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Statistics of Japanese Nationals Overseas* (1968), pp. 18-19, 38-39.
- 34) *Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas for 1972* (1973), pp. 26-27, etc.
- 35) *Annual Report for 1972*, pp. 44-45, etc.
- 36) *Annual Report for 1973* (1974), pp. 28-29, and *Annual Report for 1974* (1975), pp. 28-29.